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Dear Directorate General for Competition, 
We are writing to you in the capacity of a group of researchers who benefit from the production of 
scholarly research articles, and also as authors of scientific articles that fall under the scholarly publishing 
market.  
We write to notify you of what we believe to be the anti-competitive practices of RELX Group in the 
scholarly publishing and analytics industry, based on the following two articles of the Treaty of the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU): 
1. Article 101 of the Treaty, which prohibits agreements between two or more independent market 
operators which restrict competition; and 
2. Article 102 of the Treaty prohibits firms that hold a dominant position on a given market to abuse 
that position. 
This complaint regarding RELX Group, and specifically its daughter company, Elsevier, is based on the 
following grounds: 
1. General problems within the scholarly publishing market sector that actively prohibit competition 
in the common market between EU member states (Article 101); and 
2. Abuse of a dominant position within this market (Article 102). 
The grounds on which we believe these statements to be true are set out below with reference to the 
primary academic literature that has been studied, the general scholarly publishing landscape in the EU, 
previous competition inquiries, and financial statements from RELX Group. In 2002, the UK Office of Fair 
Trading Standards published a report (OFT 396) of its investigation into the market for Scientific, Technical 
and Medical (STM) journals. Here, the report concluded that the journal market was not functioning well 
due to inelastic demand, a lack of price competition and sensitivity, and that regulatory intervention 
would be required should conditions fail to improve. Here, it is our view that the natural interventions 
proposed in the report (price restraint from commercial publishers; increased buyer power; academic 
power; and the impact of new Web technologies) have not occurred, and we shall provide evidence to 
demonstrate that each of these factors is still contributing to what we believe is a dysfunctional market. 
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The present complaint follows a similar referral of RELX Group to the UK Competition and Markets 
Authority in 20161, following the recommendation of (then MP) Ann McKechin, previously in a BIS sub-
committee hearing in 2013. Here, she advised that RELX Group (at that time known as Reed Elsevier) 
should be referred to the competition commission if it continued to use non-disclosure agreements, which 
she termed a “profoundly anti-competitive practice”, and said that if this was happening with public funds 
“there should be a referral to the Office of Fair Trading”. To date, there has been no formal response to 
this referral, and, as we shall demonstrate, it is our view that these anti-competitive practices and 
dysfunctional market conditions continue and do not serve either researchers, institutes, or the public 
interest effectively.  
We focus primarily on Elsevier, its history and present business practices, the ongoing threat it continues 
to pose to the present scholarly publishing market, and the wider implications that these has on the role 
of scholarly research in society. Elsevier is the single largest publisher of scholarly research articles, owning 
more than 2,500 scholarly journals, and between 2012 and 2015, Elsevier published almost 1.4 million 
journal articles, the vast majority of which are not publicly accessible. In relative terms it is one of the 
smallest Open Access publishers, publishing just 27,000 OA articles in 2017 out of 436,0002 (around 6.2%). 
We fully acknowledge that much of what we discuss in this complaint can also be applied to other major 
players within the wider scholarly publishing market, and discuss some additional details to provide this 
context.  
Background 
The EU Higher Education sector is funded through a variety of public, private, and philanthropic streams. 
How this is administered through the various EU member states is highly variable, but has one thing in 
common: from these pools of money, a fraction is devoted to the purchasing of subscription access to 
scholarly journals, books, and databases that are critical to future research and higher education in the 
EU. The European Commission themselves are an important funder for these activities throughout Europe 
as a whole. Streamlined access to these resources is essential for the modernisation of education 
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programs, advancing quality research and innovation, and equipping graduates and researchers with high-
level transferable skills, as well as all of the wider benefits to society that these resources bring.  
In a pre-Internet era, scholarly publishers were tasked with the crucial roles of printing and dissemination 
of physical goods. However, now using widely available Web-technologies, industries like scholarly 
publishing should have benefited from massive reduction in the costs associated with these key services, 
and economies of scale; however, Elsevier and other publishers have profited from the impact of the Web 
by diversifying their services, but the expected concurrent reduction of costs has not manifested, or 
reflected in the prices they continue to charge. The total size of the global Scientific Technical and Medical 
(STM) publishing market in 2013 was estimated by Outsell at USD $25.2 billion, with around 68-75% of 
this coming from academic library subscriptions3. The vast majority of this is gained through selling 
research content that higher education institutes produce back to those same institutes through a range 
of licensing agreements. 
Traditionally, individual academic institutes have negotiated subscription licensing agreements on an 
individual basis with a number of scholarly publishers. This has created a heterogeneous and fragmented 
landscape based on the affordability to individual institutes, which is often contingent on funding that 
they make available through their respective library budgets. In recent years, there has been the 
formation of numerous national bodies or consortia that now negotiate nationwide licensing contracts on 
behalf of research institutes. For example, Jisc in the UK, VSNU in the Netherlands, Project DEAL in 
Germany, and Bibsam in Sweden. The establishment of these consortia represents the first time in which 
collective bargaining has been leveraged in an attempt to place downward pressure on some scholarly 
publishers due to their regressive business practices, and for actively delaying the EU’s vision towards a 
full transformation to Open Access. 
A further principle aim of these consortia has been to work with scholarly publishers to help accelerate 
the transformation of a subscription-based system to one of Open Access (OA). Here, all global citizens 
would have the intrinsic right to freely access and, depending on copyright and licensing constraints, re-
use the outputs of scholarly research; something that is so important that it is embedded into Article 27 
of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights4. This universal access is intended for the betterment of 
a healthier society, to accelerate scientific research and discovery, to catalyse further innovation in the 
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private and public sectors, and drive economic growth. This is a key aspect of the EU’s vision for Horizon 
Europe and Horizon 20205, but the pace of transformation has been slow, costly, and complex. Many 
publishers have shown little initiative to help realize this vision and alleviate the current obstacles, many 
of which are intrinsic to maintaining their businesses.  
This relatively slow rate of change towards OA recently catalysed the release of ‘Plan S’ to help accelerate 
the transition towards full and immediate OA to scientific publications6. However, the impact that Plan S 
will have on both the subscription and OA market remains eminently unclear, especially given uncertain 
present market conditions. For example, Plan S foresees a price cap on article-processing charges (APCs) 
for OA, but it is not yet public how this cap will be set, what it will be based on, and how publishers respond 
to it. This is another prime example of how these pricing schemes do not really operate as a true ‘market’ 
(see below for more on this). However, in previous scenarios where such a cap has been enforced (e.g., 
the UK higher education system for tuition fees), what this created was a system where every university 
simply charged as much as possible, trending towards the maximum, with this price reflecting little to do 
with the underlying costs or services. Such a system is undesirable for virtually everyone, except those 
who exploit the caps. Furthermore, a recent report on behalf of the European Commission concluded that 
“pursuing a short-term increase in access, at any cost, is unlikely to lead to a more competitive and 
sustainable market”7, and therefore it is likely that Plan S will have little effect on impacting wider market 
conditions. Thus, we believe that there is still scope for this complaint and intervention from the EC 
despite wider changes currently happening within the scholarly publishing system. 
The scholarly publishing ‘market’ 
Non-substitutable goods 
Here, it is worth noting that we believe the term ‘market’ is not entirely appropriate for the scholarly 
publishing industry. A key aspect of any well-functioning market is the concept of substitutable goods - 
that is, if one is not satisfied with the quality or value of a product, it can be substituted for another. This 
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fuels competition and innovation in any market, and ultimately wider economical and societal benefits. 
In the case of scholarly publishing, this simple aspect of a free market is entirely absent, and in our view 
represents an undesirable quality of the current state of scholarly communication (Eve, 2014). This lack 
of substitutability affects both authors and readers, both of which are typically researchers. Each scholarly 
journal and each research article that a journal contains is absolutely unique and non-rival - that is their 
purpose, and their inherent value. This end product is the result of the strong differentiation that peer 
review typically administers around each article. For research to progress, access to all available relevant 
sources is required, which means that there is no ability to transfer or substitute products, and there is 
little to no inter-brand competition from the viewpoint of consumers. If a research team requires access 
to knowledge contained within a journal, they must have access to that specific journal, and cannot 
substitute it for a similar one published by a competitor. Indeed, the entire corpus of research knowledge 
is built on this vital and fundamental process of building on previously published works, which drives up 
demand for all relevant published content. As such, publishers do not realistically compete with each 
other, as all their products are fundamentally unique (i.e., each publisher has a 100% market share for 
each journal or article), and unequivocally in high demand due to the way scholarly research works. The 
result of this is that consumers (i.e., research institutions and libraries) have little power to make cost-
benefit evaluations to decide whether or not to purchase, and have no choice but to pay whatever price 
the publishers asks with little transparency over costs, which we believe is a primary factor that has 
contributed to more than a 300% rise in journal prices above inflation since 1986. Thus, we believe that a 
functional and competitive market is not currently able to form due to the practices of dominant players, 
like Elsevier, in this sector. 
Ultimately, these states prevent public higher education institutes from using their funds to invest in 
sustainable or more diverse services as part of any competitive market. A major consequence of this is 
that alternative systems and services become excluded, as they are unable to compete with the dominant 
players, despite often being more cost-effective, efficient or sustainable options. This issue is 
compounded by the issue of prestige and career advancement for individual researchers, which 
automatically imposes a strong bias against newer or innovative entrants to the marketplace. The result 
of this is the illusion of a functional scholarly publishing market, whereas the reality is that each single 
research article functions as its own, non-competitive and monopolistic micro-market, in which copyright-
protected high prices can be set that need not be related to any of the actual underlying costs (Armstrong, 
2015). Thus, it is our view that scholarly publishing is a special type of market, but it remains presently 
unclear whether it is this monopolistic nature of each article, or the high aggregate measure of journal 
6 
concentration among a few selected publishers, which creates most dysfunction in the present market. 
This requires particular precautions in order to make sure that the economic activities of Elsevier and 
others still comply with EU competition rules, the absence of which we believe to represent a practice 
that contravenes Article 102 of the FTEU. 
Non-disclosure agreements 
For a legitimate and free-functioning market to exist, there must be fair price competition, which we 
believe is clearly absent; primarily due to the widespread use of non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) 
between publishers and their clients. The limited evidence available (e.g., Lawson et al., 2015) shows that 
this absence is real and harmful, with large price disparities among clients for essentially the same 
services, and also irrespective of what other publishers are charging. This condition is generated by the 
practices of Elsevier and other large publishing companies, who have little incentive to allow such a 
competitive marketplace to exist, as this will directly impact upon their revenue streams. In our view, the 
result of this is the apparent misuse of substantial amounts of taxpayer money each year and continued 
damage to the higher education sector and the benefits that this brings to wider society. For example, 
through demonstrated inconsistencies in negotiated price for comparable research institutions, which 
does not align with the fundamental role of governmental agencies to distribute research funding in order 
to deliver a return on taxpayers’ money. 
The costs of licensing agreements between Elsevier and individual organisations are difficult to obtain, as 
they are typically legally protected by confidentiality clauses, imposed by the publishing houses. Because 
there is little price sensitivity, Elsevier journals essentially charge as much as they possibly can, simply 
because this is what they can get away with being paid. A very conservative estimate from the EUA Big 
Deals Survey suggests a cost of around €400 million per year in Europe. We believe that these non-
disclosure agreements severely act to the detriment of the entire scholarly market, to the benefit of no-
one but Elsevier, by preventing other clients and organisations from being able to see how much each 
pays for their individual licensing agreements. As such, they are explicitly emplaced to prohibit any sort 
of active or fair price competition, despite the fact that the products being sold by different parties are of 
little material difference. It is clear to us that this anti-competitive practice prohibits the functioning of 
any sort of sustainable8 market for scholarly publishing based on competitive pricing and consumer 
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satisfaction. This practice has become deeply embedded as a standard practice between the largest 
scholarly publishers, and leads to an overall dysfunctional scholarly publishing market (in our view 
contravening Article 101 of the TFEU). The fact still stands that public access to important information 
about cost, required for a functioning market to develop, is being sacrificed in order to protect the 
financial interests of Elsevier.  
In 2013, David Tempest, previous Director of Access Relations at Elsevier, argued that if other 
libraries/institutions of higher education worldwide were to know the amount Elsevier charges for access, 
“everybody would drive down, down and down” on prices, leading to users paying less for accessing these 
materials (i.e., the goal of fair market competition). This is a somewhat embarrassing, but eye-opening, 
statement captured on video at a public event9, and is direct admittance from an Elsevier employee about 
how they control the market through anti-competitive practices. Thus, the fact is that there is potential 
for such a functioning competitive market based on existing services, but Elsevier actively prohibit this 
through their current business practices. The result of this is that Elsevier apply dissimilar pricing 
conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties (at the institutional and national level, as 
indicated above), placing them at a significant competitive disadvantage and decreasing their welfare as 
consumers; in our view this is in direct conflict with Article 102 of the FTEU. 
Oligopoly of scholarly publishing 
Due to the aforementioned widespread use of NDAs, data on many of the financial aspects of scholarly 
publishing are opaque. The scant information available on financial flows has come from the use of 
Freedom of Information requests, and available only in a few nations around the world (e.g., the USA, 
New Zealand, and the UK). For example, UK universities spent £40 million to access full-text articles 
through ScienceDirect between 2010 and 2014 (Lawson et al., 2015); content that is otherwise 
predominantly inaccessible to non-subscribers. Around 26% of Elsevier’s total income currently comes 
from Europe10. These attempts to improve transparency through FOI requests have often come from 
individuals concerned about the state of the industry, and indicate that a concerted policy-led action is 
required now in order to improve the state of competition in the market. A recent report from the 
European University Association provided some insight into the expenditure of 28 EU member states on 
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‘big deal’ contracts, providing the first insight into the landscape in Europe and revealing great disparities 
in the cost of Big Deals across Europe, which seem to exist irrespective of the different levels of cost 
transparency due to national legislation11. 
A recent, independent, and reasonable estimate in our view is that a grouping of Taylor & Francis, Wiley-
Blackwell and Elsevier together account for over 50% of all published science papers in 2013, with Elsevier 
owning around 25% of the total market (Larivière et al., 2015). This same study showed that Elsevier’s 
dominance is as high as 71% for fields such as psychology, which indicates a clear monopoly over certain 
research disciplines. The process of consolidation and concentration continues, perhaps emphasised best 
by the 2015 merger of Springer and Nature Publishing Group into Springer Nature; now the second largest 
scholarly publisher. Due to the unique characteristics of the scholarly journal market, different players 
dominate specific subsets. For example, Sage is the dominant publisher in Humanities and Social Sciences, 
while Springer Nature, Wiley, Elsevier, and Taylor and Francis together publish around 50% of all medical 
and natural science research, based on the most recent estimates. The 2002 OFT report noted that 
Elsevier had a "a forty one percent share of the supply of science and technology journals". Elsevier 
themselves claim to publish just 17% of the world’s research articles12, although the basis for this estimate 
is unknown, and is contradictory to a range of independent analyses. The STM report in 2015 noted that 
Elsevier were the second biggest publisher after Springer based on number of journals alone (Ware and 
Mabe, 2015; Table 3). According to data provided by SciLit, Elsevier are the top publisher by articles, more 
than twice the size of its next competitor, Springer Nature, and publishing 20.7% of the total global 
number of articles in 201713. 
In some countries such as Switzerland, Elsevier publish 22% of all articles, and are by far the largest 
publisher of Swiss research. It has also been recommended that the ETH board in Switzerland refer 
Elsevier to the Competition Commission (in 2016) to evaluate whether they are abusing this dominant 
position14. In other countries, such as Finland, total costs of subscriptions to Elsevier between 2010 and 
2015 increased by 34% (€6.41 million in 2010 to €8.58 million in 2015)15. These revenue increases now 
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consume 34.3% of the total costs paid to publishers by Finnish universities. Similar to Finland, information 
obtained in the Netherlands from FOI requests revealed that more than 25% of the total national 
expenditure on serials goes towards Elsevier, around three times more than their closest competitor 
(Wiley Blackwell)16. The VSNU released the 2018 Elsevier subscription agreement17, revealing that the 
national cost of this was €12.2 million. None of these factors help the digital economy and scholarly 
publishing market to grow through fair competitive procedures. Rather, we believe that they are about 
consolidating Elsevier’s dominant position in this sector, while stifling economic growth or innovation.  
This oligopoly (i.e., collective dominance of the marketplace by a few actors) formed after an extensive 
period of mergers and high-profile acquisitions by Elsevier and others (Sage, Taylor and Francis, Wiley, 
and Springer Nature), which accelerated from the late 1990s and onwards, catalysed in part by the 
systemic transition to online publication for journals. An independent study revealed that in the last 20 
years alone, Elsevier have acquired or merged 340 organisations, tools, or services, primarily composed 
of other journals, publishers and analytical services18. The impact of this consolidation, combined with a 
general lack of transparency, is that new entrants face increasingly high barriers to an increasingly 
exclusionary market (although see above on why the reality is that no legitimate marketplace actually 
exists), and smaller players (including learned societies) reduce their market share and are eventually 
forced out. This competitive edge was noted in the 2002 OFT report, which noted that Elsevier has a 
positional advantage to exploit over new entrants to the market. Here, no matter how efficient or 
beneficial new journals/services might be, Elsevier’s dominant position makes it more difficult for others 
to gain any sort of establishment or reputation. Further consequences include artificially high and 
increasingly unaffordable costs, limited utility of research outputs, proliferation of well-documented 
Western publishing biases, and continued systemic lock-in. 
Excessive profit margins at the expense of the public 
In 2013, the revenue from Elsevier’s Science, Technology and Medicine (STM) division was £2,126 million, 
with an adjusted operating profit of £826 million (39%). They have a fairly consistent adjusted profit 
margin of around 37%, which has increased from around 33% in 2002 (note that it could even be as high 
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as 40-50% for their STM division before tax19). This level is more than double of that commonly found in 
the oil industry (approximately 16%), and far outstrips pharmaceutical companies (around 6.5%). It is 
noteworthy that these profit margins were not affected even when the rest of Europe was suffering from 
the deepest of economic crises. The latest figures from 2017 reported an underlying growth in adjusted 
profit margins of 6% over 201620. The majority of this revenue comes from institutional library budgets, 
with around 68-75% coming from public sources (Ware and Mabe, 2015). We feel that such continuously 
excessive margins also provide little incentive for behavioural changes in terms of increasing efficiency, 
and exist in spite of the fact that more efficient alternatives readily exist. This is a consequence of there 
being little real competition within the scholarly publishing market. 
These continuous annual increases occur despite Elsevier’s already excessive profit margins, also bearing 
in mind that much of its labour and products are provided for free from the research community. Typically, 
the research articles themselves are taken from researchers along with full rights to those works, and the 
quality control through an editorially-controlled peer review process is often performed as a pro bono 
service (although apparently some of their editors receive a nominal compensation, but information on 
this is not public). It is likely that if publishers were forced to either pay royalties to researchers for their 
work, or an industry-standard consultant rate to editors and reviewers, the entire scholarly publishing 
system would cease to function as it now does. While having high profits does not in itself contradict the 
FTEU, in this particular case they are the direct consequence of practices that do, as well as being based 
on what we believe are unethical relationships with the wider research community. This raises more 
fundamental questions about the relationship between the scholarly publishing market and the impact 
that it has on the wider higher education and research system. 
Big deals 
Elsevier typically offers ‘subscription bundles’ of individual journals, often called ‘big deals’, that lock 
research institutes into multi-year business-to-business contracts with steady annual price escalation for 
content, irrespective of whether they actually want, need or use individual titles within the bundle. What 
the ‘big deal’ essentially does is create a product in which it is conditional for a purchaser to buy all of the 
products offered from a dominant supplier. Thus, while there might be the possibility to decide on 
acquisition (licensing) for individual titles, it becomes much more difficult to do so when all titles from a 
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publisher are bundled. By their very nature, we believe these practices are abusive as - irrespective of the 
circumstances around them - they actively restrict competition and prevent other competitors from 
having any form of leverage within the market. This is especially the case for smaller or newer publishers, 
irrespective of how much more efficient and sustainable their services might be for the research 
community, and this capacity of Elsevier to enforce market discrimination must be investigated. 
Furthermore, as these agreements are often concealed by default (due to non-disclosure clauses), we 
believe that they are irresponsible while distorting any true competition, and therefore anti-competitive 
in multiple ways. Combined with Elsevier’s market dominance, this practice is in direct contradiction with 
Article 102 of the FTEU. 
Due to the size of Elsevier, the ‘big deal’ has become a powerful tool for enforcing their position, as refusal 
to purchase their products could have substantial negative consequences. These practices by Elsevier, and 
other large publishers, whereby the cost of subscriptions has outpaced that of inflation by almost 300% 
since 1986, have created a system where libraries could only afford access to an increasingly limited 
number of journals (Roth, 1990); a financial phenomenon widely called the ‘serials crisis’. It is expected 
that, in 2019, there will be an additional 6% annual price increase for journal titles21, which in our view is 
eminently unsustainable and continues to threaten research library budgets and the future of scholarly 
communication, while continuing to threaten and damage the global scholarly publishing market. This 
issue is now further exacerbated by the increasing focus on ‘OA big deals’, in which funds are reallocated 
from subscriptions to OA, but with the consequence that native OA publishers are discriminated against 
in the same was as through subscription expenditures. It is our belief that this situation represents the 
clear and ongoing abuse of a dominant market position, and contravenes Article 102 of the FTEU. 
Hybrid Open Access journals 
Elsevier is the largest hybrid Open Access (OA) publisher (Björk 2017). An independent 2014 study 
revealed that hybrid article-processing charges (APCs) from subscription-based publishers, such as 
Elsevier, were nearly twice as much as equivalent rates from publishers that published exclusively OA 
content (Björk and Solomon 2014). This higher rate, which is also what the wider ‘hybrid market’ seems 
to be converging on, at around £1,500-£2,000, appears to have arrived at least partially as a consequence 
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of the publication of the ‘Finch Report’ in the UK in 201222. This report was heavily criticised by both 
independent researchers, and branches of the UK government. For example, it appears to have selectively 
excluded critical published data, leading to the promotion of specific agendas from the scholarly 
publishing industry, while making erroneous statements that equated high costs with high quality, and 
low costs with low quality. The UK stance of a stated preference for ‘gold’ OA has manifested as a 
preference for hybrid OA as a consequence of this, and is divergent from virtually all other national OA 
policies in the EU23, and has been criticised as one of the key elements in further creating highly 
dysfunctional market conditions (Björk and Solomon 2014).  
Data from the UK’s Wellcome Trust revealed that the average APC for an Elsevier hybrid title was around 
64% above that for fully OA titles24. This was supported by the 2015 review of the RCUK (now UKRI) OA 
policy, which also revealed that around 40% of OA articles published by Elsevier were non-compliant with 
the policy as they were not appropriately licensed25. The prices of these APCs do not actually appear to 
have anything to do with the cost of article processing. For example, Björk and Solomon (2014) showed 
that they are set more based on the levels of funding available for authors, and also normalised to some 
degree by discipline (Lawson, 2014). The result of this is that consumers are arbitrarily charged 
substantially higher prices that are virtually unconnected to the actual costs of supplying publishing 
services, actively discriminating against participants based on price, and constituting a behaviour that is 
objectively inefficient in creating fair and sustainable market conditions. 
The reason why Elsevier, and other large commercial publishers, have this strong preference for hybrid 
OA is that they are able to leverage and raise the symbolic capital of their titles (i.e., branding and 
prestige), which they can use in turn to increase APCs. Due to this, hybrid OA has a high market 
concentration around major publishers, who still presently derive most of their income from 
subscriptions. In a marketplace where these symbolic factors primarily define where researchers submit 
their work, it makes new entrants to the publishing market disadvantaged right from the offset, 
irrespective of the intrinsic value they provide beyond prestige and branding. For example, it is now 
eminently feasible to disseminate information at a much lower cost thanks to the emergence of Web-
based technologies including social networks, e-books, a range of self-publishing options, and the fact that 
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electronic copying is essentially costless and the peer review process for scholarly articles is typically 
provided by researchers as a pro bono service; however, none of these options have impacted upon the 
scholarly information market, as Elsevier has the advantage in that it distributes prestige through its 
services, which comes at the cost of knowledge dissemination. We believe that Elsevier exploits this 
through a system of production limitation and artificial scarcity, despite the obvious technical 
developments that can easily overcome this, to the prejudice of consumers. It is also noteworthy that 
Elsevier appear to have persistently engaged in a practice known as ‘double-dipping’, whereby APCs for 
hybrid titles are accrued in addition to costs associated with subscriptions for those same titles, instead 
of offsetting those costs26. This is best exemplified with the recent renegotiations of the big deals with 
Sweden and Germany, in which it was consistently difficult to negotiate any sort of reasonable offsetting 
agreement with Elsevier. Finally, increasing APCs show that they are not sensitive to market conditions, 
but instead closely connected to the perceived value based on venue prestige and reputation.  
The European Commission itself recognises that hybrid OA is unsustainable, and in June 2018, announced 
stated its intention that it would no longer pay APCs for hybrid titles under its 2021-27 Research and 
Development programme, which is a distinct shift from Horizon 2020 in which such fees were supported27. 
This was more recently followed up by similar statements by Plan S, in which 11 national research funding 
bodies (and growing) announced they would no longer support funding for hybrid OA. Nonetheless, the 
STM Association, which represents Elsevier and other publishers, shows strong support for hybrid OA28, 
despite these statements from the EC, and also contrary to almost all published evidence that hybrid OA 
is not working well to create stable market conditions, or a transition to a full OA system. Indeed, one 
independent study demonstrated that Elsevier is financially unable to undergo a full transformation to an 
OA publishing system (Morrison, 2017). Thus, Elsevier and others are actively enforcing their collective 
position to try and maintain inflexible market conditions, and it might be the case that wider investigation 
is required to examine the extent to which these actors are collectively abusing the present market 
conditions. The hegemony of Elsevier represents the current paradigm of modern scholarly publishing, 
where increasing commercialisation is threatening the quality of research and equity within higher 
education more broadly. The outsourcing of reputation management to the commercial publishing sector 
has led to the situation in which a prestige economy is deeply and seamlessly integrated with the academic 
                                                          
26 The cost of double dipping, David Prosser, Research Libraries UK (Accessed 06/08/2018). 
27 Commission staff working document: Impact assessment, European Commission.  
28 STM urges funders to retain hybrid open access as an option in the future, STM Association. 
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enterprise, which ultimately gives Elsevier control over how to set prices. It is our view that this represents 
abuse of a dominant market position, and contravenes Article 102 of the FTEU. 
Vertical integration and user/vendor lock-in 
Vertical integration of services creates a ‘virtual lock in’ environment for Elsevier’s customers and users, 
ensuring that its digital services crowd out and exclude those of its competitors from the market. This 
applies particularly to a range of downstream competitive services within scholarly publishing and 
communication, and now represents the ongoing concentration of scholarly infrastructures by Elsevier 
and a small number of ‘competitors’ (Posada and Chen, 2018). The inherent risk of Elsevier’s corporate 
restructuring into a data and analytics service provider is that through a system of vertical integration, 
they will now dominate the wider scholarly research ecosystem, while simultaneously owning much of 
the infrastructure that even its competitors use; something unprecedented in any other industry. We 
believe that this is Elsevier pre-empting the inevitable transition to full Open Access that it has been 
slowing down for some time now, while preparing to shift its vendor lock-in from ‘big deals’ into ‘service 
big deal’ packages. 
The most recent example of this is the acquisition of the Aries publication workflow service. This service 
is used widely by other scholarly publishers, which will now therefore become dependent on Elsevier for 
functionality. This is the first time that a single publisher will have direct control over the publishing system 
used by its competitors, with little oversight to ensure that the service to, and data of, competing 
publishers will be protected. The effect of these acquisitions is to strengthen the already dominant 
position of Elsevier through all aspects of the scholarly communication process, while simultaneously 
threatening the future of scholarly infrastructures through enclosure of critical services. This will put 
important aspects of higher education at further risk, such as regarding faculty recruitment and retention, 
research productivity, university rankings, and probability of securing research funding. This 
transformation towards services and data analytics is also occurring within Taylor and Francis, Springer 
Nature, and Wiley (Posada and Chen, 2018), and we believe represents a broader systemic issue about 
ownership over critical academic infrastructure. 
Elsevier also control data and analytics services that are used by universities (and other publishers) to 
assess the reputation of journals, researchers, and institutions. These services for citation metrics and 
alternative metrics/altmetrics (used to evaluate researchers) and for university rankings are in part based 
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on Elsevier’s own journals, as well as those of its competitors. It is our belief that institutions feel that to 
be competitive they must have access to the journals that are used to assess their research quality, and 
in order to replicate the research assessment methodologies they are forced to buy into the same Elsevier-
owned products, such as Pure and Scopus. This also means that you have a single provider in charge of 
not only a large proportion of scholarly publishing, but also in a strong position of analysing and evaluating 
that same system. The inherent conflict of interest here was demonstrated by independent research 
which showed that journals owned by Springer Nature, scored up to 40% lower using CiteScore rankings 
(based on Scopus data, owned by Elsevier), whereas Elsevier titles increased by around 25%, compared 
to their journal impact factors (owned by Clarivate Analytics and Web of Science). These figures were 
subsequently revised after incorporating the Lancet journal series (also now owned by Elsevier), and 
showed a similar pattern in that Elsevier journals still gained between a 10-12% rise compared to their 
impact factors, while Nature-branded journals were lowered by 25-40%29. Recently, these vivid conflicts 
of interest, particularly surrounding the European Commission’s Open Science Monitor, led to a formal 
complaint to the EU Ombudsman, co-signed by more than 1000 researchers (Tennant, 2018). This issue 
was subsequently investigated by the Directorate-General for Research and Innovation of the European 
Commission, who, while providing substantial detail into the awarding process of Elsevier, did not directly 
or adequately answer many of these prominent concerns raised about the role of Elsevier. The response 
from the EC is currently being annotated in preparation for a counter-reply to request more information 
for the questions that were not sufficiently answered here. 
To quote Posada and Chen (2018): “In both Elsevier and Wiley, institutions and individuals are encouraged 
to adopt the services due to inter-institution competition. In Elsevier, funding competition and the need 
for publication success drives this adoption, while in Wiley, cost reductions and competition between 
institutions for students serve as the rationale for this adoption. Yet in both cases, control is transferred 
to the publisher as their recommendations/consulting becomes increasingly “crucial” to achieving the 
goals of institutions/individuals, whether funding/publication or enhanced enrolment in education; with 
the motivations of the institutions in particular tied into the global university rankings. At the same time 
the integration of services by large publishers and the resulting dependence makes it harder for 
alternative services to emerge or succeed, particularly since they do not have the disproportionate access 
to content which can be used to reduce service operating costs in addition to being integrated into their 
                                                          
29 Lancet Publishing Group, Eigenfactor. 
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service.” We believe this summarises some of the core issues discussed within the present complaint, and 
helps to illustrate the wider context and importance of addressing them. 
Negative impact of ‘market’ dysfunction on academic culture 
The scholarly publishing market indirectly influences the structure of academia/HE institutes and 
individual career advancement, which is now often dictated by where researchers are able to publish their 
research, and the perceptions of journal prestige associated with this (based on branding, reputation, and 
marketing). In modern academia, this deeply entrenched cultural effect is so pervasive that it even has its 
own mantra, “publish or perish”, and is perpetuated by publishers, researchers themselves, institutes, 
and funders due to the inappropriate association of journal reputation with academic reward systems. 
This strong coupling between career advancement requirements and commercial interests means that 
researchers are often highly constrained in their freedom of choice about where to publish, which creates 
a strong ‘competitive’ bias towards larger, more prestigious, and more-established players. Note that, in 
our view, this also means that cost and price associated with licensing agreements or OA have very little 
do with any fundamental aspects regarding the research itself, or the production costs, but are more 
based on the ‘standing’ (value) that a researcher receives from publishing in a particular venue. It is also 
worth conveying that one of the primary inputs necessary for these journals to function does not cost the 
journal itself anything. Articles are typically given freely by researchers, who often even have to pay fees 
for submission and publication, irrespective of whether the article becomes OA or not. It is not clear why 
this strange norm exists or persists, as it stands in stark difference to other branches of publishing. What 
this means is that, irrespective of the revenues and profits generated from subscriptions or OA big deals 
by publishers, none of this ever actually goes back to the authors required to generate that revenue in the 
first place; a factor which undoubtedly contributes to some of the exceptionally high profit margins seen 
by the biggest players in the industry. While this is not necessarily a violation of the TFEU, we believe that 
understanding the wider consequences of the dysfunctional scholarly publishing industry on academic 
cultures provides importance context to consider here. 
Even with the ongoing evolution of OA, we believe that authors are largely only granted the illusion of 
'free choice' because of the constraints of the evaluation system heavily relying on journal prestige. 
Recently, Springer Nature, one of the largest scholarly publishers, admitted in the prospectus for its 
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delayed IPO that it intended to continue to use the prestige of its journals to raise prices for Open Access30: 
“We also aim at increasing APCs by increasing the value we offer to authors through improving the impact 
factor and reputation of our existing journals”(page 99; note that this prospectus was removed from being 
online after it received widespread criticism and the IPO failed, but the authors of this complaint 
downloaded a copy during the window when it was available)31. This statement offered valuable insight 
into how traditional publishers view the current market place, with value differentiated based on journal 
brands, and capitalised on financially through the inherent need of researchers to compete for these 
exclusive brands. Even in the digital Web-based age where knowledge dissemination can be effectively 
unlimited, it is our view that these journals operate under the pretence of artificial scarcity that drives 
researchers to compete for their brands, which has ramifications for how the entire research process is 
both conducted and funded. Thanks to the power of the Web, it is essentially cost-free to distribute 
electronic journals to additional readers; however, the ideal outcome for a commercial publisher intent 
on generating profits is to extract maximum revenue from every single potential reader based on their 
willingness to pay; a strategy known as ‘first degree’ price discrimination. Thus, even the movement 
towards an OA system is, in our view, to a large extent simply replicating the existing dysfunctions of the 
subscription-based market, by having the major and dominant players systematically abusing the prestige-
based career advancement system; it remains unclear whether these practices by the large publishers will 
continue unchecked with the recent unveiling of Plan S. 
A lack of competition reduces innovation and increases costs to the 
taxpayer 
One major consequence of Elsevier’s dominant position (in conjunction with the few other major players 
with analogous financial interests) in this dysfunctional oligopoly is that a transition from a content-based 
organization that mainly benefits the corporations towards a service-based organisation that benefits 
everyone has yet to occur. On the edges of the scholarly communication landscape, starting in developing 
countries such as Brazil and other Latin American countries, service-based publishing organizations were 
established. First SciELO, now over 20 years ago, then others such as Ubiquity Press32, Scholastica, Arpha 
                                                          
30 Linking impact factor to 'open access' charges creates more inequality in academic publishing, Bianca Kramer and 
Jeroen Bosman, Times Higher Education. (Accessed 13/09/2018). 
31 Please note that a copy is also available via the Internet Archive. (Accessed 16/10/2018). 
32 Publishing with Ubiquity Press, Ubiquity Press. (Accessed 11/10/2018). 
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and others33. Others, such as the Journal of Machine Learning Research, are even more efficient with 
average article production costs of USD $6.5034, so less than 0.5% of what Elsevier currently charge for an 
equivalent service. In contrast to the legacy publishers, whose revenue mainly derives from selling 
content, these organisations derive revenue by providing exchangeable services: if their customers such 
as scholarly societies publishing field-specific journals are not satisfied with their services, they can switch 
to a competitor. Comparing the per-article revenue of the two systems exemplifies both the potential for 
saving public funds and the main cause for the legacy publishers’ resistance. While subscriptions (i.e., 
selling content) provide legacy publishers with approx. €3,800-5,000 revenue per article (Schimmer at al., 
2015), the service-based organisations only receive around €400-500 per article in revenue. After a 
transition from a content-based to a service-based organization of scholarly communication, these costs 
can be assumed to come down even further, due to increased scale and innovation/efficiency due to 
competition (Bogic and Ballesteros, 2016). Thus, if such a transition were to take place, taxpayers would 
stand to see a more than 90% drop in the costs of scholarly communication while users were to enjoy 
increased value because of the increased innovation, openness and transparency. 
The recent Springer Nature IPO prospectus exposes how other publishers also continue to view this 
situation. They state (Section 1.16, Risk Factors): “Compared to traditional publishers, open access 
publishers face lower barriers to entry. For example, pure open access market participants do not require 
a sizeable sales force. Furthermore, the technical equipment required for open access publishing, such as 
hardware and software, is becoming less expensive. While the offerings of new and smaller competitors 
may be of lower quality, an increase in these offerings may nevertheless lead to a reduction in demand 
for our subscription-based offerings. New competitors in the open access market may also gain market 
share, resulting in a weakening of our market position. Furthermore, increased competition in the open 
access market could put downward pressure on the APCs, thereby adversely affecting margins we earn in 
the open access business. If any of these risks were to materialize, our investments in the open access 
business model would not yield the expected returns, and our results could be materially adversely 
affected.” Essentially, the way to interpret this is that Springer Nature see competition and innovation as 
a risk to their business model (which it is), and thus again reveal the view that they have very little 
incentive to let any fair market conditions arise due to the threats that this poses. 
                                                          
33 How much should a scholarly article cost the taxpayer?, Björn Brembs. (Accessed 11/10/2018). 
34 An efficient journal, The Occasional Pamphlet. (Accessed 11/10/2018). 
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Strong corporate opposition thwarts current reform efforts 
What this dysfunctional system creates is a cycle of journal lock-in, due to the persistence of this positional 
advantage and the increasing entrenchment of established publishers like Elsevier. Here, librarians and 
researchers must coordinate within this cycle in order to gain any sort of academic capital, which they 
achieve by continuing to perform the same actions as other groups. The UK’s Office for Fair Trading 
recommended in 2002 several potential steps to take to improve competition without the need of 
regulatory intervention. This includes: 
1. Price restraint from commercial publishers; 
2. Increased buyer power; 
3. Academic power; 
4. The impact of new Web technologies. 
For point 1, we have clearly not seen this, and the serials crisis continues unchecked, with Elsevier gaining 
higher revenues and profit margins than ever before; their latest financial report shows continued growth 
in publishing revenue and profits35, despite the ongoing tensions with EU member states like Germany 
and Sweden. This indicates that even national level subscription cancellations have a negligible impact on 
Elsevier’s revenue streams, and certainly there is no evidence to suggest influence on their business 
practices. For point 2, we are beginning to see the emergence of collective action in the form of academic 
and library negotiation consortia. However, the impact of these at the present remains minimal, and 
Elsevier continue to dominate the landscape in terms of ‘big deals’ for both subscription and OA licensing 
agreements. Furthermore, APCs and costs of journal subscriptions are still increasing faster than inflation, 
and Elsevier are still reporting increasing profit margins, and therefore buyer power seems to be having a 
negligible impact at the present; and it certainly does not seem to be helping to make the marketplace 
more accessible to newer entrants. For point 3, while there has been some anecdotal evidence of 
academics refusing to review, submit, or edit for journals, the impact of this again has been negligible due 
to the sheer size of Elsevier. If anything, for point 4, the dominance of Elsevier has stifled the application 
of new technologies in the scholarly publishing system. Well-established technologies in other industries 
such as machine learning, artificial intelligence, and social networks, are only in their infancy, while much 
                                                          
35 RELX’s first-half results ease concerns over German and Swedish universities dispute, ProactiveInvestors. 
(Accessed 30/07/2018). 
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of the core technologies are still based on archaic systems and vastly inefficient compared to the progress 
being made in other industries. Elsevier have also been clever to capture any emergent competitors in 
this domain, including data analytics providers, networking and preprint platforms, and other information 
handling systems, as part of its corporate restructuring into an analytics service provider. This not only 
stifles innovative competition, but also prevents them from growing further than the constraints of 
Elsevier’s operational protocols, thereby reducing any impact emergent technologies could have on the 
scholarly publishing market. 
Conclusions 
We believe that the present scholarly communication market is clearly not functioning well due to a 
number of related reasons. High subscription charges still reign, publishers still offer limited access to 
research to the wider public, many continue to reap excessively high profits, and many financial elements 
of the process is shrouded in secrecy. Much of these peculiarities exist due to a combination of content 
aggregation and concentration by a few large players, chief among which is Elsevier, that each individual 
research article acts as a mini-monopoly meaning that consumers have no buyer power over content, and 
the use of non-disclosure clauses over licensing agreements which restricts any sort of competitive 
consumer power. These activities continue unrelenting, despite numerous warnings over the last several 
decades. 
As such, the natural interventions that could have created a fair competition market for scholarly 
publishing have clearly not worked. The 2002 report by the OFT concluded that if competition in this 
sector fails to improve (see above points), or if additional significant information should come to light, 
then further regulatory action might be warranted on an international level. We believe that Elsevier and 
other major publishers are continuing to engage in anti-competitive practices, which are continuously 
worsening, and that information gained in the last 15 years urges immediate investigation and 
intervention into this unregulated market space. This could be, for example, through an empirical analysis 
of the scholarly publishing market; by having an independent regulatory body monitoring and overseeing 
the digital services provided by Elsevier and others within the industry; banning the use of non-disclosure 
clauses in licensing contracts; requiring transparency into the production costs of research articles and 
publishing operations; banning the use of inappropriate journal-level metrics in hiring, granting, and 
promotion decisions; abolishing copyright on journal articles; and encouraging the wider establishment 
21 
of library consortia to increase buyer power (and therefore simultaneously potentially reduce the 
monopoly power of publishers).  
It is our view that action of this sort is clearly required in order to transform the present scholarly 
publishing sector into one characterised by sustainable service-based competitive market conditions, and 
this cannot be achieved without taking explicit measures against the business practices of Elsevier and 
other large publishers. We finish by noting that Plan S is a small and welcome step in this direction, but 
requires substantially more conviction if it is to lead to the functionality of a truly competitive scholarly 
publishing market. 
Yours sincerely, 
Dr. Jonathan Tennant, UK;  
Prof. Dr. Björn Brembs, Germany 
(All writing in a personal capacity) 
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